The full story.....first battleship sunk by Air power
February 1921 US ARMY AIR First Provisional Air Brigade and the 2nd Bombardment Group
The US Army Air Service conducted the experimental bombing with Martin biplane bombers upon the obsolete ships, which were at anchor and, obviously, without crews. To the chagrin of the US Navy, proud of its fleet of battleships, the demonstrations proved the "utter vulnerability of the battleship to attacks from above," as Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, commanding the pilots and mechanics of the First Provisional Air Brigade and the 2nd Bombardment Group, declared. Mitchell discovered demonstrable proof in the ordnance tests of July 1921, culminating in the sinking of the captured German dreadnought Ostfriesland, "that seacraft of all kinds... including the most modern of battleships, can be destroyed easily by bombs dropped from aircraft."
The traditional rivalry of Army and Navy was later manifest in ugly recriminations, as Mitchell would testify before Congress that "In my opinion the Navy actually tried to prevent our sinking the Ostfriesland," while Capt. Alfred Johnson, the Naval "officer controlling the air attacks had orders from the admiral [V/Adm. Hilary Jones] not to let us sink" the battleship, in Mitchell's words.
Captain Johnson, commander of the fleet aviation of Navy and Marine pilots, reported that the Army aviators had disregarded direct orders in the bombing experiments during inspections of the damage by the Naval umpires. To the US Navy, these experiments were designed as ordnance tests to evaluate the damage wrought by detonations of aerial bombs upon the fabric of the ships: Their hulls, decks, and turrets would be minutely inspected after each hit, and a meticulous measure of explosive effects would be documented. Ultimately, gunnery would also be employed in the tests, as most Naval officers doubted that bombardment from the air could sink, or even "hurt a battleship."
The Ostfriesland would be bombed for two days and, afterward, the Naval expectation was that even the shells of the 14-in rifles of the USS Pennsylvania would not sink the dreadnought. It was the earnest and cherished belief of the Navy that depth charges would be necessary to rupture the Ostfriesland's hull, explosives to be set by a wrecking crew from the battleship USS North Dakota.
Mitchell saw his duty to the Army Air Service and mission in the bombing experiments as simple: To sink the battleship Ostfriesland.
Contrary to the Naval belief that aerial bombardment was too feeble to seriously threaten battleships, the Army Handley Page 0/400 and NBS-1 two-engine bombers bludgeoned the target ships with 1100- and 2000-lb bombs, convincing the Naval observers "that the airplane is a powerful weapon of offense." The most potent bombs fabricated for the ordnance tests, or "Project B," 4300-lb Mk. I bombs, were prohibited from use, supposedly because their sheer explosive power exceeded that necessary to utterly destroy any target fashioned by human hands. The Handley Page 0/400 was the only bomber capable of carrying this heavy bomb load, and was already obsolescent, soon (1923) to be replaced (after the stillborn, experimental tri-plane Barling Bomber was canceled) by Huff-Daland or Keystone bombers. The huge 2000- and 4000-lb bombs were designed by Ordnance Capt. C.H.M. Roberts, and manufactured at the Philadelphia Frankford Arsenal with "seamless steel casings from a Pittsburgh plant," a steel mill ironically supplying the Navy with torpedo casings from similar dies.
Roberts would test the bombs designed for the Naval ordnance tests, dropping a 2000-lb bomb out of the rack of a Handley Page from 2000-ft over the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland, remarking upon the explosion "like a volcanic eruption." Roberts described the shock wave he and pilot Capt. Norbert Carolin experienced, as the "plane... was flung high in the air, and the struts on the wings snapped all over the place." The captains feared that their bomber had suffered crippling damage in the buffeting turbulence, and "looked back to see if the tail was still there," but landed safely.
In the Ostfriesland bombing, Roberts would jettison his 2000-lb bomb, as the Handley Page carrying him ditched in the sea, and the crew was rescued by a destroyer. "With a pair of pliers," Roberts had "crawled out and unhinged the bomb" as the bomber glided seaward before the ditching, for the handle of the bombrelease lever had been wrenched off by the crew striving to jettison its weight.
The Ostfriesland was sunk by aerial bombardment, "and by airplanes with bombs alone," being bombed from low altitude (2500- to 3000-ft) in clear weather, as the board remarked in qualification of the results. The Joint Army and Navy Board maintained that the battleship, rather than obsolete in the face of aviation, was "still the backbone of the fleet" and aerial bombardment was only a novel hazard to the dreadnought, necessitating improvement in antiaircraft batteries for defense, and aircraft carriers for protective screens of aircraft at sea. Recommendations were offered for the "imperative" pursuit and development of aviation by the Navy and the Army in the future.
See Air force magazine article
The US Army Air Service conducted the experimental bombing with Martin biplane bombers upon the obsolete ships, which were at anchor and, obviously, without crews. To the chagrin of the US Navy, proud of its fleet of battleships, the demonstrations proved the "utter vulnerability of the battleship to attacks from above," as Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, commanding the pilots and mechanics of the First Provisional Air Brigade and the 2nd Bombardment Group, declared. Mitchell discovered demonstrable proof in the ordnance tests of July 1921, culminating in the sinking of the captured German dreadnought Ostfriesland, "that seacraft of all kinds... including the most modern of battleships, can be destroyed easily by bombs dropped from aircraft."
The traditional rivalry of Army and Navy was later manifest in ugly recriminations, as Mitchell would testify before Congress that "In my opinion the Navy actually tried to prevent our sinking the Ostfriesland," while Capt. Alfred Johnson, the Naval "officer controlling the air attacks had orders from the admiral [V/Adm. Hilary Jones] not to let us sink" the battleship, in Mitchell's words.
Captain Johnson, commander of the fleet aviation of Navy and Marine pilots, reported that the Army aviators had disregarded direct orders in the bombing experiments during inspections of the damage by the Naval umpires. To the US Navy, these experiments were designed as ordnance tests to evaluate the damage wrought by detonations of aerial bombs upon the fabric of the ships: Their hulls, decks, and turrets would be minutely inspected after each hit, and a meticulous measure of explosive effects would be documented. Ultimately, gunnery would also be employed in the tests, as most Naval officers doubted that bombardment from the air could sink, or even "hurt a battleship."
The Ostfriesland would be bombed for two days and, afterward, the Naval expectation was that even the shells of the 14-in rifles of the USS Pennsylvania would not sink the dreadnought. It was the earnest and cherished belief of the Navy that depth charges would be necessary to rupture the Ostfriesland's hull, explosives to be set by a wrecking crew from the battleship USS North Dakota.
Mitchell saw his duty to the Army Air Service and mission in the bombing experiments as simple: To sink the battleship Ostfriesland.
Contrary to the Naval belief that aerial bombardment was too feeble to seriously threaten battleships, the Army Handley Page 0/400 and NBS-1 two-engine bombers bludgeoned the target ships with 1100- and 2000-lb bombs, convincing the Naval observers "that the airplane is a powerful weapon of offense." The most potent bombs fabricated for the ordnance tests, or "Project B," 4300-lb Mk. I bombs, were prohibited from use, supposedly because their sheer explosive power exceeded that necessary to utterly destroy any target fashioned by human hands. The Handley Page 0/400 was the only bomber capable of carrying this heavy bomb load, and was already obsolescent, soon (1923) to be replaced (after the stillborn, experimental tri-plane Barling Bomber was canceled) by Huff-Daland or Keystone bombers. The huge 2000- and 4000-lb bombs were designed by Ordnance Capt. C.H.M. Roberts, and manufactured at the Philadelphia Frankford Arsenal with "seamless steel casings from a Pittsburgh plant," a steel mill ironically supplying the Navy with torpedo casings from similar dies.
Roberts would test the bombs designed for the Naval ordnance tests, dropping a 2000-lb bomb out of the rack of a Handley Page from 2000-ft over the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland, remarking upon the explosion "like a volcanic eruption." Roberts described the shock wave he and pilot Capt. Norbert Carolin experienced, as the "plane... was flung high in the air, and the struts on the wings snapped all over the place." The captains feared that their bomber had suffered crippling damage in the buffeting turbulence, and "looked back to see if the tail was still there," but landed safely.
In the Ostfriesland bombing, Roberts would jettison his 2000-lb bomb, as the Handley Page carrying him ditched in the sea, and the crew was rescued by a destroyer. "With a pair of pliers," Roberts had "crawled out and unhinged the bomb" as the bomber glided seaward before the ditching, for the handle of the bombrelease lever had been wrenched off by the crew striving to jettison its weight.
The Ostfriesland was sunk by aerial bombardment, "and by airplanes with bombs alone," being bombed from low altitude (2500- to 3000-ft) in clear weather, as the board remarked in qualification of the results. The Joint Army and Navy Board maintained that the battleship, rather than obsolete in the face of aviation, was "still the backbone of the fleet" and aerial bombardment was only a novel hazard to the dreadnought, necessitating improvement in antiaircraft batteries for defense, and aircraft carriers for protective screens of aircraft at sea. Recommendations were offered for the "imperative" pursuit and development of aviation by the Navy and the Army in the future.
See Air force magazine article